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Abstract
The degree to which prevailing land tenure arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa constrain
efficiency and agricultural productivity are still not determined. This paper examines the
sources of economic efficiency (inefficiency) of alternative land tenure arrangements in
Ethiopia using stochastic frontier production function. The results show that sharecropped and
borrowed land are technically less efficient than owner-cultivated or fixed rental land due to
restrictions imposed on them by landowners and the interactions of land market with other
imperfect and absent input markets. Thus, a policy has to be drawn to facilitate more efficient
transactions of land between farmers and to minimise inefficiencies associated with these
tenure systems.
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Summary
The effect of alternative land tenure arrangement on agricultural productivity is still not
determined. While some researchers (e.g. Hayami and Otsuka 1993) argue that tenancy
arrangements such as sharecropping result in inefficient allocation of resources, others (e.g.
Cohen 1980; Boserup 1981; Place and Hazell 1993) contend that various factors other than
the system of land tenure are important determinants of agricultural productivity. Hence,
whether or not alternative tenure arrangements constrain agricultural productivity remains an
empirical question, which depends on the specific economic and policy environments under
which farm households operate.
This paper attempts to investigate the technical efficiency of alternative land tenure
arrangements in Ethiopia, a country where land markets and land policy are critical issues for
agricultural development due to the high pressure on land. Prior to 1974, land tenure in
Ethiopia was predominantly based on a feudal system. Where land is privately owned, of
which the majority was in the hands of the nobility and the church. After the revolution of 1974,
land was nationalised, declared collective property of the people and distributed to tillers. Land
transaction was banned and all forms of tenancy relationships were prohibited. Since 1991,
land lease has been allowed, but rural land still remains state property. Different forms of
tenancy (sharecropping, fixed rental, and borrowed/ gifted) are now being practised throughout
the country, providing an ideal context to study the efficiency of alternative tenure
arrangements.
Results are based on data generated through a survey of 161 households operating 477 plots
in the Arsi zone of Oromiya Region in 1994. While 115 households had of their own land
(received land from the government through redistribution), the rest were operating leased
land. Data were collected on inputs and output, plot characteristics, wealth status and
demographic characteristics of the household as well as input and output prices.
The average value of output per hectare was Ethiopian Birr 2478 (about US$ 310), and the
highest return was obtained from owner-operated land. Average returns from gift plots were
significantly lower than those from owned and rented plots. Average re- turns from
sharecropped plots and gift plots were not significantly different from each other.
Plots under the different tenure forms received significantly different amounts of planting and
weeding labour, whereas rented and sharecropped plots received less than half of the labour
input on owner operated plots. However, the use of seed, inorganic fertiliser and herbicides
did not change with variations in land tenure systems. There was no significant difference in
land quality by tenure. Rented and sharecropped plots are mainly planted with wheat, a
principal cereal crop in the area.
Farmers covered by the study have attained a 71% efficiency rate on average; indicating that
an improvement in the technical efficiency of farmers can result in an increase in crop income
of 30%. We thus find that the type of land tenure affects the technical efficiency of agriculture
significantly. Sharecropped, and gifted/borrowed plots are significantly less efficient than
owner-operated plots. However, there was no significant difference in efficiency between
owner-operated and fixed rental plots. Moreover, there was no significant difference in
efficiency between sharecropped and fixed rental, and between sharecropped and
gifted/borrowed plots. Fixed rental plots were more efficient than gifted/borrowed plots.
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1    Introduction
In most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agricultural land is the fundamental base of livelihood for
the rural population. Due to its economic importance, land markets and land tenure security
issues in SSA have received considerable public attention. Most of the debate centres on the
effect of indigenous land rights on land productivity, resource allocation and investment
demand (Dorner 1977; Harrison 1987; Place and Hazell 1993; Besley 1995; Gavian and
Fafchamps 1996; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). While some argue that indigenous land rights
lead to inefficient resource allocation justifying governments intervention in land administration
to remove the associated inefficiencies (Johnson 1972; World Bank 1974; Dorner 1977);
others have challenged this view (Bales 1986; Besley 1995); others argue that inefficiencies
arise because indigenous land rights are ambiguous, communal, and afforded insufficient legal
protection, resulting in tenure insecurity (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997). Furthermore, others
such as Cohen (1980) and Boserup (1981) argue that indigenous tenure arrangements are
dynamic and evolve in response to factor price changes.
While the analytical focus has been on indigenous land rights, communal control under these
systems is diminishing and African tenure systems are evolving towards individualisation of
land rights in response to population pressure, agricultural commercialisation, changing
political structure and technological changes (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). Despite the
considerable analysis of indigenous land rights in African agriculture, the efficiency of these
evolving land rights and land markets have received little attention.
Evidences from different parts of Africa confirm instances of privatisation of land rights (Migot-
Adholla et al. 1991). In Ethiopia, contracts between farmers who received government-
allocated land and landless tenants including sharecropping, fixed rentals, lending and gifting
dominate the current land market. Ethiopia presents an ideal context for studying both the
evolution of land tenure institutions and their impact on technical efficiency. Elements of the
traditional systems of land tenure, dramatically affected by the 1975 land reform measures,
appear to be re-emerging. In particular, land leases and sharecropping that existed before
1975 dominate the current land market. Land market and land policy continue to be critical
issues for the Ethiopian development strategy given the high pressure on land by a
predominantly agricultural population. An import- ant policy issue is whether the government
intervenes in land market through redistribution and restriction of land transactions. Moreover,
the land market in Ethiopia is dominated by evolving institutions in the form of land contracts,
so that the analysis of the efficiency of these evolving institutions provides significant guidance
for effective policy formulation. This paper analyses the development of land markets and the
efficiency of current land contracts and its implications on land policy in Ethiopia.
In the analysis of land market evolution, we examine the impact of political changes and other
economic and institutional factors on existing land tenure arrangements. We argue that the
evolution of these institutions is a result of the combination of political economy, government
intervention in land and rural labour markets, and population pressure. For example, the
sharecropping system has its roots in the land tenure system of feudal Ethiopia, while land
lending and gifting re-emerged when land and farm labour transactions were prohibited during
the socialist system of public ownership.
The efficiency of the current land tenure arrangements is then examined using a stochastic
frontier production function. It is hypothesised that the different types of land contracts vary
substantially in their technical efficiency, which refers to the ability of the farmer to obtain
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maximal output from a given set of inputs on a given plot of land, controlling for other factors
that affect input use and productivity. It is argued here that unobservable component of inputs
(e.g. effort in the case of labour, that will differ on contracted plots), and differences in such
unobservable inputs lead to differences in technical inefficiency. If the hypothesis is true, given
the notion that land contracts are evolving, land policy should be directed towards encouraging
the more efficient land transactions.
The next section of this paper reviews the theoretical literature on tenancy contracts, efficiency
and imperfect factor markets. The evolution of land contracts in Ethiopia is analysed in Section
3. In Section 4, the land tenure survey conducted in the Arsi zone is described and then the
current land tenure arrangements are examined. This is followed by examining the efficiency
of current land contractual forms in Section 5, using data from the Arsi survey. Here, the
analytical and empirical framework of the efficiency of the prevailing land contracts are first
described and then the results of the econometric analysis are presented. Conclusions and
policy implications are presented in Section 6.
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2    Tenancy contracts, efficiency and imperfect factor markets
Despite the large body of literature on tenancy contracts and agrarian organisations (Otsuka
and Hayami 1988; Singh 1989; Otsuka et al. 1992), the rationale and relative efficiency of
agricultural land contracts is still much debated. In an extensive review, Otsuka et al. (1992)
claim that the reason behind the theoretical confusion and inconclusive empirical results is the
separate analysis of land and labour contracts. Accordingly, land tenancy, labour employment
and owner cultivation need to be considered together.
Underlying the efficiency of alternative land lease contracts is the incentive system that each
contract system provides to the contract holder. Under the assumptions of perfect markets and
no risk, an efficient incentive system requires that the contract holder be the residual claimant
to the output (Varian 1993). Such an arrangement would induce the contract holder to produce
the optimal level of output where the marginal product of the worker's extra effort equals the
marginal cost of putting that effort. Given these assumptions, owner-cultivated and fixed-rental
tenancy should thus result in an efficient resource allocation.
Following the assumptions of perfect market and no risk, Mill (1848) and Marshal (1890) and
numerous others have concluded that share-tenancy results in an inefficient resource
allocation, since the share tenant receives, as marginal revenue, only a fraction of the value of
his or her marginal product of labour, thus limiting the tenant's incentive to supply labour or
other inputs at the optimum level. On the other hand, Johnson (1950) and Cheung (1969)
have argued that if effort is costlessly enforceable, sharecropping arrangement can be as
efficient as owner-cultivated and fixed-rent tenancy. However, whether costs of monitoring and
enforcement are low enough to result in efficient sharecropping remains an empirical question.
The tenant's labour input may not be fully observable due to the spatial nature of agricultural
production, i.e. the landowner may not be able to ascertain whether a low yield in the tenant
field was due to low labour input, unfavourable weather conditions or any other stochastic
factors.
Risk and market imperfections can be important in the agriculture of developing countries.
Tenancy may not at all be necessary if there are no market imperfections other than imperfect
land markets (Pender and Fafchamps 2001). If markets for all factors other than land are
perfect, landowners can rely on those markets to allocate resources optimally. In the presence
of production risk and missing insurance markets, risk pooling may be an important
consideration in tenancy contracts. Cheung (1969) thus argues that risk pooling may be the
motive for sharecropping.
Asymmetric assumptions about the enforceability of land and labour contracts have created
considerable confusion in the literature on agrarian institutions (Otsuka et al. 1992). If tenants
have less work incentive under sharecropping than under fixed rental, because the share
tenant claims only a fraction of his/her marginal product, it follows that labour hired under fixed
wage rate should even have weaker work incentives, and enforcement of their work effort
should be more costly than in the case of share tenancy. In line with this, another argument for
the existence of sharecropping is the difficulty of monitoring labour effort. Stiglitz (1974)
argues that if labour effort is unobservable, sharecropping may dominate wage labour due to
its incentive advantages, and fixed- rental because of its risk pooling advantage.
There have been several attempts to establish a rationale for the existence of share- cropping
arrangements under certainty. For example, self-selection model developed by Hallagan
(1978) considers share tenancy as one of the land contract arrangements from which tenants
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can choose to best utilise their entrepreneurial ability. Otsuka and Hayami (1988), however,
show that when the landlord's optimisation behaviour is neglected (i.e. when there is no
information about the tenant's work ability), then either the fixed-rent contract or wage
employment will be chosen. On the other hand, if the landlord's optimisation behaviour is
incorporated and the amount of land is sufficiently restricted, as done by Allen (1985), then
both share and fixed-rent tenancy can achieve similar resource allocations.
However, Otsuka and Hayami (1988) argue that even in the case of enforceable contracts
under certainty, there is no positive reason for sharecropping arrangement to exist if the
optimisation behaviours of both the tenant and landlord are considered, since an infinite
number of optimum combinations of share and fixed rents exists, with no single combination
being preferred to the other. Under the condition of uncertainty, however, the existence of
sharecropping arrangements can be justified based on its role in risk sharing, with or without
enforceable contract as long as both tenant and landlord are risk averse.
Available evidence, mostly from studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s in South and
South-East Asia, on the efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts, Otsuka and Hayami
(1988) do not find significant inefficiency of share tenancy reported by most of those studies.
However, they argue that lack of significant inefficiency may not mean that there is no problem
of contract enforcement but rather sharecropping is adopted where the landlord's cost of
enforcing the tenant's work effort is less. Otherwise, landlords with relatively high enforcement
costs would prefer fixed-rent contracts even at the expense of a reduced rent that
compensates tenants for greater exposure to risk. Therefore, in the absence of institutional
restrictions on the scope of contract choice and assuming that landlords select contracts on
the basis of their comparative advantage in monitoring tenants' work effort, there should be no
significant inefficiency associated with share tenancy, compared to other tenancy forms
(Otsuka et al. 1992). However, as it is difficult to assess the enforceability of the contract, the
relative efficiency of the land contracts, for example owner-operated versus fixed rented or
sharecropped tenures, becomes an empirical issue, while controlling for other factors that
affect input use and productivity (e.g. land quality and farmer's ability). A recent study by
Gavian and Ehui (1998) found that total factor productivity was lower on contracted land
(either cash rented, sharecropped, gifted or borrowed) than owner-operated land, although the
differences could not be attributed to differences in inputs.
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3    Evolution of land market in Ethiopia
3.1 The pre-1975 period
3.2 The Derg period (1975–91)
3.3 The post-1991 period
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, three land tenure regimes have existed under
three distinct political regimes. These were: (1) the feudal system of the pre-1975 period; (2)
the state ownership of the socialist system in the 1975–91 period; and (3) the semi-liberal and
market-oriented system since 1991. Even though land tenure institutions continuously evolved
in response to the political environment, rural demographic dynamics, expansion of markets,
natural resource conditions (particularly soil erosion), and social and physical infrastructures,
these three periods marked important pivotal points in the development of the prevailing land
tenure system in the country. Thus, the process of the evolution of land contracts is better
understood when it is analysed in light of the land tenure systems during these three periods.
 3.1 The pre-1975 period
The land tenure system in pre-1975 Ethiopia was one of the most complex and intricate
systems. It represented the issue of power and governance in Ethiopia, as land was the major
source of income and livelihood in this predominantly agrarian economy. The land tenure
system varied from region to region due to the diverse geographical and cultural settings and
the different socio-political events that occurred in different parts of the country. These
different land tenure arrangements, in general, can be categorised into usufructuary tenures
and private tenures (Dessalegn 1984). The usufructuary tenure systems include the rist,
semon and maderia or yemengist forms that differ principally in the type of institution holding
the ultimate reversionary rights over the land.
The rist system was one of the oldest and most common forms of usufructuary tenures that
characterised the land tenure system of northern Ethiopia where the community held the
ultimate reversionary rights over land. Rist was a right, which a holder could claim a portion of
lands from his or her ancestors who originally held the land. Village chiefs, who were usually
appointed by the district's governors, administered the rist-related land rights. These hereditary
rights were subject to payment of taxes and provision of other services to the local
administration or gult (Hoben 1973). Holders of the rist could bequeath their holdings but could
not sell, mortgage or exchange it in any form. This land tenure system featured communal
characteristics and provided somewhat an assured access to land to all members of the rist.
The security of individual holdings was also protected in this system through honouring of
hereditary rights and denying access to 'outsiders'. Nevertheless, the possibility of a claim at
any time to a part of the land that was protected by rist subjected rist holders to varying
degrees of insecurity. Farmers used to spend significant time in land-related court cases,
sometimes even between close relatives (Hoben 1973).
With respect to access to land, this type of usufructuary tenure system is very similar to other
indigenous tenure systems of sub-Saharan Africa. The main difference lies in the way rights
are traced. Unlike other hereditary rights that are either matrilineal or patrilineal, rist rights
could be traced through any relative, even through one's spouse (Hoben 1973). Therefore, a
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person could potentially claim rist rights to a host of land tracts than the person actually
fawned and/or farmed. Consequently, the numerous claims of rist rights and subsequent
litigation over land parcels severely diminished security and incentives to invest in farmland.
Furthermore, the tradition of subdivision of holdings to heirs led to a continuing fragmentation
of holdings in the densely populated northern highlands of Ethiopia.
The semon, a system where the church held the primary reversionary rights, arose when the
Crown granted rural land to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church to generate financial and material
support for its services. The church during this period owned a substantial share of tax-free
rural lands. As the church itself was not directly involved in farming, it leased out its lands to
local farmers under sharecropping arrangements and collected the rents as well as land taxes
(tributes) that would have otherwise gone to the government treasury.
Maderia or yemengist lands were originally unoccupied lands that were declared state
property, most of which were located in the south. When the imperial government conquered
the south, south-west and eastern parts of the country, all unoccupied (unsettled) rural land
were declared state property and given to officials and loyalists of the Crown (Dessalegn
1984). During the military advance by the emperor, militiamen were among those who
received land in these regions. This constituted what was called the gebbar system, which is a
form of freehold tenure. Holders of such rights had the privilege to transfer the land through
sale, mortgage or exchange subject to payment of land tax to the government treasury. As
most of the lands were granted to the powerful officials and loyalists of the Crown, the local
populations in these areas became landless and entered into tenancy relationships with
landlords.
All the rist, semon and maderia or yemengist tenures were similar in providing use rights to
the holder while institutions held the ultimate reversionary rights over individual holdings were
different. The nature of tenure arrangement and security of tenure on individual holdings was
highly dependent on the holder's relationship with the institution governing access to land.
During this period, the prevalence and characteristics of land rental markets was dictated by
the type of land tenure system as well as by the political environment. The traditional rist
system in the north reduced the need for land market development compared to that in the
south where freehold tenure dominated. For example, between 1967 and 1970, only 7–16% of
the rural population were renters in the northern provinces as compared to 37–73% in the
south (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). The rist system, by assuring access to all members of the
community, equalised land endowments and so there were very few landless peasants.
Landlessness, however, was common among traders, potters, weavers, and tanners who
were not allowed to own land (Mesfin 1991), as most of these activities were carried out by
immigrants from other places and, thus, were considered 'outsiders'. Thus, most of the farmers
in the north were owner cultivators, and tenancy was primarily restricted to those forbidden to
own land. Tenants who owned land were those with excess labour and oxen and wanted to
increase their holdings, and sharecropping was the dominant form (Cohen and Weintraub
1975). Most of the landowners were farmers themselves and so their ability to monitor and
enforce contracts was diminished. Furthermore, failing rains and recurrent drought made
agriculture a risky enterprise. Because rist land was more likely to be claimed and taken away
by another person, the farther away one lived from one's land, absentee landlordism was
virtually non-existent (Hoben 1973).
In the south, however, land was distributed to only a few people who were allowed to buy and
sell land. As a result, most of the farmers were tenants, with sharecropping and fixed rents
being the dominant forms of land contract. Even though absentee landlordism was prevalent,
sharecropping was sustained because landlords could hire supervisors who lived in the same
communities with tenants to enforce the contracts. Even without supervision, landlords used
threats of eviction and political power to enforce contracts, and usually determined the
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sharecropping arrangement.
Resource pooling may have played a critical role in the south for the existence of
sharecropping especially for the less powerful landowners that resided in the same community
as their tenants and farmed part of their land. Landowners provided credit to their tenants
(Dessalegn 1984), who supplied their labour and animal power. Fixed rents, on the other
hand, most likely resulted from absentee landlordism and inability to enforce contracts.
In both the north and south, there existed three major forms of sharecropping arrangements
classified according to the share of harvest paid to the landowner as rent. In siso (one-third)
arrangement, the tenant supplied all the inputs, mainly seed, oxen and labour, and paid one-
third of the harvest to the landowner as rent. Since the tenant paid one-tenth of the harvest as
land tax, known locally as asrat, before sharing the harvest with the landowner, the tenant
effectively retained 60% of the harvest. In irbo (one- quarter), the rental payment was one-
fourth of the harvest after deducting the asrat, and so the tenant effectively retained two-thirds
of the total harvest. In equl (equal) arrangements, the landowner sometimes supplied some of
the inputs, especially oxen and seed, and after paying the asrat, the harvest was divided on a
50:50 basis (Cohen and Weintraub 1975).
Of the three forms of sharecropping arrangements, siso was dominant. A study in Arsi, central
Ethiopia, indicated that of all the tenancy in the study area, 60% were under siso, 30% under
equl, and 10% were hired farm labourers (Cohen and Weintraub 1975). Most of the
sharecropping agreements were verbal and the terms were based on customary practices of
each area. Upon termination of the agreement, the tenant was not compensated for any
improvements he or she made on the land (Dessalegn 1984).
In the early and mid-1960's, the country's economy was heading in a capitalistic direction.
Financial institutions and industries increased, markets expanded, and modern administration
systems and physical infrastructure extended into remote parts of the country. Land rental
markets thrived with the expansion of commercial agriculture and introduction of
mechanisation and modern agricultural inputs since the early 1960's. These same
developments seem to have affected sharecropping arrangements, as the improvement in
agricultural productivity coupled with population growth raised sharecropping rental rates. Irbo
arrangement became rare and siso gradually shifted to equl (Cohen and Weintraub 1975).
With the growing recognition of the land tenure system as a fundamental restraining factor to
the country's agricultural development effort, and as an underlying cause of land degradation
and unequal income distribution, the need for land reform became the key issue of the time.
Scholars, development planners, and policy makers expressed the need to institutionalise
formal and legal procedures for land markets. The regime's third five-year plan emphasised
this need and proposed protection of tenants from arbitrary eviction, establishment of fixed
rent system and ending of sharecropping system, institution of land leasing arrangements and
compensation of tenants for land improvements, registration of land rights, and adjudication
procedure. Speaking on the occasion of the submission of a draft legislation to parliament to
reform some features of the land tenure system, the Emperor expressed the need to replace
the customary land tenure system with a modern and formal land tenure institution:
The intent of the draft legislation is to define the rights, duties and responsibilities
of tenants and landlords, to ensure a fair and equitable share of returns for both
parties, to provide the required governmental assistance if and when both parties
wish to have a written agreement of document specifying their obligation, and to
provide an incentive for sustained increase in the income of both parties by
establishing on a legal basis the traditional and customary system (cited in Cohen
and Weintraub 1975, p. 96).
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3.2 The Derg period (1975–91)
The landlord-tenant relationship and the rist system continued to be the dominant land tenure
institution in most parts of the country until the military took over power in 1974, to begin what
is known as the Derg regime. The Derg launched a radical land reform programme that
covered all parts of the country. The March 1975 decree ended all forms of customary land
tenure and landlordism. All rural lands were declared state property and redistributed to the
tillers, primarily based on family size and quality of the land in an attempt to create equity and
fairness in land acquisition. The same decree also banned all kinds of land transactions and
wage labour in rural areas to ensure that the tillers remained the beneficiaries of the land.
Accordingly, farmers could neither sell, mortgage, lease out, and transfer the land allocated to
them, nor use hired labour. Land rental and farm labour markets legally ceased to exist.
The power and responsibility to allocate and administer land was given to the local Peasant
Associations (PAs), the lowest administrative unit of the regime. Following this major agrarian
reform, rural farmlands in Ethiopia have belonged to the 'people' but controlled by the
government. The only formal way of obtaining access to land was through membership in the
PA and periodic redistribution of existing crop and pasture lands among households based on
family size and land quality. Subsequent measures of land redistribution, collectivisation,
villagisation, and resettlement programmes were undertaken.
The demand for land by the rapidly growing farmer population in rural areas could not be met
through land redistribution. Although tenancy and use of hired labour were banned by law,
farmers gradually started to informally lease out their lands to close relatives and friends and
temporarily give out part of their holding as gift to their newly married relatives, due to
population pressure and increasing landlessness.1 The practice of lending and gifting land,
with the freeze on land and rural labour transactions, suggest an altruistic motive on the part
of landowners to support the incomes of their relatives and friends. However, as we shall later
see, lending and gifting of land continued even when the freeze on land and rural labour
transactions were lifted. A rural household survey conducted by the Addis Ababa University
and the Centre for the Study of African Economies in 1994 indicates the existence of such
informal land markets during this period.2 Out of the total of 1281 sampled households that
held at least one plot of cropland, 27 (2%) of them reported that they had obtained some plots
from other farmers some time between 1975 and 1990 (Amare 1998). Except for one
household that held the plot under fixed rental, the other 26 held their plots under
sharecropping arrangements. One-half of these households were in the Amhara region, where
sharecropping was an older institution. In Ankober and Debre Berhan (Amhara Region) alone,
about 7 and 11%, respectively, of the sampled farmers were cultivating at least one plot
contracted-in during the time of the survey. Given the short-term nature of informal land
contracts, other farmers, too, might have imported and used such lands and returned it before
1994 when the survey was conducted. Thus, it is likely that the number of farmers who
participated in such informal land market could be higher than the study revealed.
1. The practice of land lending and land parcel gift probably existed before the Derg regime
as in many other African countries as an extremely common form of advanced inheritance.
The practice during the Derg regime, however, was temporary (e.g. until the next land
redistribution) as farmers cannot give away government land and perhaps is given for older
children and relatives for exchange of labour or oxen power.
2. The survey was conducted through collaboration of the Addis Ababa University (AAU), the
Centre for the Study of African Economics, Oxford University (CSAE) and the International
Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). The sample comprised two woredas in Tigray(Geblen
and Atsibi), four in Amhara (Debre Berhan, Ankober, Bugna and Yetmen), four in Oromiya
(Adaa, Korodegaga, Adele Keke and Shashemanne)  and five in Southern regions of Ethiopia
(Bule, Bolosa, Doma, Indibir, and Azedeboa).
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In 1990, the Derg regime issued the so-called 'mixed economic programme' that liberalised
some of the highly centralised system of economic management. The reform conferred a
transferable and life-long lease to holders of rural lands. With this reform, the ban on
temporary land lease was lifted and farmer-to-farmer land contracts became official. Thus, the
government intervened only to formalise an on-going process. The reform, however, did not
establish legal procedures and institutional mechanism to allow the development of formal
land markets. Nevertheless, more and more farmers started to engage in various kinds of
informal land markets.
Thus, the land market during this regime continued to evolve. In contrast to the sharecropping
and fixed-rent arrangements that were dominant under the feudal system, lending and gifting
were practised as a result of population pressure and increasing landlessness. These forms of
land transactions implicitly responded to the ban on rural labour market, as lending and gifting
of land were associated with the tenant providing some of his labour to the landowner's
farmland in exchange for land.
 3.3 The post-1991 period
After the fall of the Derg in May 1991, the new government reaffirmed what the previous
regime had established by constitutionalising state ownership of all rural lands. Article 40(3) of
the constitution states that:
The right of ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural
resources, is exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a
common property of the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and shall
not be subject to sale or to other means of transfer.
The new constitution, which was adopted in 1994, allows temporary leases. The constitution
guarantees the rights of peasants and pastoralists of free access to land and the right of
individuals to claim compensation for improvements they make on land including the right to
bequeath, transfer or remove such improvements when the right to use the land expires. Now,
farmers have the right to use the land indefinitely, lease it out temporarily to other farmers,
and transfer it to their children but cannot sell it permanently or mortgage it. Although the
constitution has resolved some issues, it seems to create other ambiguities and does not
address some important issues (Fitsum et al. 1999). For example, given the scarcity of land, it
is not clear how peasants' rights of free access to land can be assured in practice, and how
much land peasants are entitled to. Those issues have been left to the regional governments
to resolve and there have been significant differences across the regions with respect to
development of a regional land policy.
In Tigray Region, for example, the land policy issued in 1997 states that there will be no
further redistribution of land except where major infrastructure investments such as irrigation
necessitates redistribution. So far, that policy is holding and no redistribution of land has taken
place in the region since 1991. Consistently, with the constitution and practices, the policy also
allows leasing of land for up to 10 years if the lessee uses 'modern technology' and for only
two years if the lessee uses 'traditional technology'. However, the policy fails to define what
constitutes modern and traditional technology (Fitsum et al. 1999). The regional government in
Tigray also issues land registration certificates to landholders. The policy also allows for
inheritance with some restrictions to discourage land fragmentation among family members.
Some of the issues being considered in Amhara Region are allowing consolidation of fields
through exchanges and issuing land certificates. While a major land redistribution was
undertaken in Amhara in 1997 and 1998, there has been none in Oromiya Region for more
than ten years (Bezuayehu et al. 2000); although no official statement has been given by the
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regional government for abandoning redistribution. In an effort to rehabilitate degraded areas
and reduce landlessness, however, the Tigray and Amhara regional governments issued
directives in 1999 to distribute wasteland on hillsides to individuals and groups for private tree
planting and agroforestry (Fitsum et al. 1999; Lakew et al. 2000). These directives, however,
seem to have been prompted by the success of the practice in Tigray since 1992 and in the
Wello area of Amhara Region since 1997.
As the constitution permits, short-term leases such as rental and sharecropping are practised
all over the country, in response to land scarcity in all regions. However, there is still no
institutional mechanism and legal procedure to protect temporary land contracts and arbiter
conflicts. Currently, such disputes are handled in a court run by peasant associations (PAs).
With uncertainties surrounding land ownership, land rental and sharecropping arrangements
re-emerged as superior forms of land contracts in the rural areas besides land lending and
gifting, which were the dominant forms of land transaction during the Derg regime.
The next section examines these land contractual forms. Hypotheses and evidence about
their existence and dominance from different parts of Ethiopia are compared and contrasted,
based on data from a survey undertaken by the International Livestock Research Institute
(ILRI) in the Arsi zone of Oromiya Region in 1994, in addition to other surveys and case
studies. Then, in Section 5, the efficiency and determinants of inefficiency of the land contract
forms are examined, using the stochastic production frontier approach and data from the ILRI
survey.
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4    Prevailing land contracts in Arsi
4.1 Common types of land contracts
Data used in this paper is obtained from a survey in Arsi zone of Oromiya Region conducted in
1994 to identify factors influencing evolution of land tenure institutions and to determine the
effects of land tenure on investment, productivity and efficiency in crop–livestock systems in
the highlands of Ethiopia.3 The study area is one of the most productive areas of Ethiopia.
Four peasant associations (PAs), the lowest level of administration consisting usually of 3–4
villages, were selected for their varying altitudes and, thus, mix of crop and livestock activities.
A census carried out in 1994 provided a sampling framework for classifying households based
on their access to state lands. Households were classified as either PA members if they have
received at least one plot from the government or as landless if they had not acquired either
crop or pasture land from the government. Out of the total farming population of 1671
households, 83% were PA members (Gavian and Ehui 1998). A random sample of 161
households of which 115 were PA members was selected from  the census list.
3. Highlands are those areas predominantly above 1500 masl.
The selected households controlled 477 separate plots, defined as a distinct management unit
due to the farmer's choice to plant a specific crop and variety and apply specific quantities of
production inputs. Plot area was measured. Data on all inputs including labour time by source,
field operations, amount of animal traction, seeds, fertiliser, pesticides and herbicides used
were collected from all sampled plots during the main 1994 cropping season. Information was
collected twice weekly by asking the farmer to recall his or her activities on particular plots
during the previous three days. Quantities of cereals, pulses and residues produced on each
plot were weighed after threshing and winnowing at the end of the season.
In a separate survey, the prices of all crops and residues were collected twice per month in
each of two major rural markets frequently visited by the farmers in the study area. Average
prices were used to value total output of each plot. In addition, demographic data on each
sampled household was collected. These include family size, age, sex and education of the
head of the household, number of ploughing oxen owned, and number and types of livestock
owned by the household, converted to tropical livestock units (TLUs).
 4.1 Common types of land contracts
The ILRI survey shows that 16% of all cultivated plots were contracted, with 31% being fixed
rentals, 25% being sharecropped, and the remaining 44% were borrowed or gifted (Table 1).
This shows the slight dominance of fixed rentals compared to sharecropping. Credit constraint
and resource pooling by resource poor farmers appears to be the main motive for
sharecropping. In contrast to the pre-1975 period of landlord-tenant relationship, share-
cropping now involves multi-way factor exchange between two farmers with different factor
endowments and within the same social class. This is supported by the increasing contribution
of farm inputs by landowners to tenanted fields. For example, the ILRI survey shows that
landowners contributed between 2 and 31% of the total oxen draft, fertiliser, pesticides and
seed inputs on sharecropped fields, while in the AAU/CSAE/IFPRI survey, 13–40% of tenants
responded that their landowners had contributed to supply of seed, oxen, fertiliser and labour
inputs. Underlying this contribution by landowners is the removal of fertiliser and other
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subsidies, and lack of draft oxen.
Table 1. Nature of contracts for crop lands in Arsi zone, Ethiopia.
  PA-allocated
Contracted
Rented Shared Borrowed
Share of contracts for cropped fields (%) 83 5 4 7
Users
PA-member households (number) 100 18 76 64
Landless households (number) 0 83 24 36
No. of years field used by current farmer 8 2 3 3
Duration of current contract (%) 
One year 0 91 63 16
Two years 0 6 7 2
Three or more years 0 0 7 0
Permanent/indefinite 100 3 23 81
Proof of contract (% fields) 
None required 0 27 77 96
Witnesses required 100 8 0 0
Written contract 0 65 23 4
Share of fields for which user holds the following right (%):
Unrestricted crop choice 100 100 100 97
Fallow for 1 year 96 87 33 16
Fallow for more than 1 year 95 64 8 13
Plant trees 92 75 12 19
Install a well or pump 77 75 12 19
Build stone bunds 79 82 37 35
Build fence from natural materials 93 89 34 55
Build fence from stone/metal 79 68 14 32
Share out 98 64 53 6
Rent out 97 62 44 6
Lend out 96 61 45 6
Bequeath 99 68 34 6
Notes: Borrowed plot includes gifted. 'Permanent', in the case of duration of current contract, means that the two
parties will honour the agreement until the government intervenes with another distribution. Source: Gavian and
Ehui (1998).
Although the traditional sharecropping is evolving towards cost and input sharing as shown
above, the traditional siso (one-third share of output to landowner) and equl (equal share)
arrangements are persisting. ILRI's survey in Arsi shows that 61% of sharecropped plots were
held under equl arrangements and the rest under siso. Lexander's observation in the same
region three decades ago, however, shows the reverse with siso arrangements dominating
(Lexander 1970). This indicates that land tenure institutions are dynamic and respond to
changing market, population and technological conditions. The resulting dynamics, however,
are not uniform in all parts of the country. For example, according to the results of the
AAU/CSAE/IFPRI survey, equl share-cropping is dominant (80–100%) in all the regions
except in Amhara, where siso (52%) is more than equl (32%). The cause for this difference
4
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seems to be differences in landlessness.  For example, with the exception of the Amhara
Region, the policy of land redistribution has not been affected for more than eight years and
so landlessness and consequent market demand for farmland and rent will tend to be higher.
On the other hand, in those areas where redistribution has not been carried out for a long
time, farmers may feel more tenure security and, therefore, more inspired to invest in land
improvement and soil fertility, which will raise land prices.
4. Besides differences in the extend of social interactions and transaction costs, productivity
of the land, and access to credit or savings may  also lead to different contract choices.  We
owe this important point  to John Pender who reviewed this manuscript.
Another reason for the prevalence of equl in comparison to siso arrangement is the extent of
resource pooling, credit, and risk sharing involved. The ILRI survey shows that landowners
bear more of the total cost of inputs under the equl arrangement (19–32%) than the siso
arrangement (4–14%). Inputs shared in equl are mostly fertiliser, pesticides, seed and
weeding, and harvesting labour. Siso, on the other hand, involved sharing the cost of only
fertiliser, oxen and seed. On average, sharecropping rents constitute 60% of total production
costs, and after paying rents in the form of share of output, a siso sharecropper gets a net
return of 1012 Ethiopian Birr (EB)5 per hectare or about twice the amount received by the equl
sharecropper (Gavian and Amare 1996). Thus, despite the fact that siso is a more 'profitable'
rental contract, more farmers are engaged in the less profitable equl arrangements. This
suggests that farmers are taking advantage of the factor exchanges and higher risk sharing or
credit involved under the equl arrangement.6 Under land scarcity conditions, however,
landowners may have more control on deciding the contractual share.
5. At the time of the survey, the official exchange rate of US $ 1 was  EB 6.329.  As at
March 2000, the exchange rate was US$ 1=EB 8.13.
6. The actual relative profitability has to be judged after subtracting the tenant's share of cost
of inputs under the two alternatives, since the siso sharecropper  may contribute more
inputs/hectare than the equl sharecropper.
Fixed rental is an emerging and growing form of land institution in the highlands. According to
the ILRI survey in Arsi, rented fields made up 31% of the total area of contracted fields (Table
1), but less than 10% according to the AAU/CSAE/IFPRI survey. Land rent is much lower than
the implicit cost of sharecropping. The average cost for renting a field in the survey area was
EB 352/ha in 1994 (US$ 56/ha) compared to EB 935/ha (US$ 148/ha) for sharecropping. This
high differential indicates that the severity of credit and capital constraints (inputs and draft
animals) among the landless.
Borrowed and gifted lands are usually given by the landholder to the user 'free of charge'.
Borrowed lands are given for a definite period, whereas gifted fields are usually given for a
longer, but indefinite period (i.e. commonly until the next land redistribution). Both types of
lands are mostly given by relatives, usually, parents to their newly-married family members. As
offspring or relatives of the landowner, many of these recipient farmers contribute labour to the
landowner's fields and so there is an implicit cost. Therefore, given these farm labour
contributions, the altruistic motive of landowners for giving land to their relatives and friends in
order to support their incomes during the Derg regime when land and rural labour transactions
were prohibited, is reduced, if not eliminated. Since these contributions were difficult to
monitor and have not been valued here, the hypothesis cannot be tested. Borrowed and gift
arrangements are fairly common, making up 44% of all contracted plots in the ILRI survey.
The prevailing three types of land contract (fixed rent, sharecrop, and gift or borrowing) differ
substantially in their duration and the range of rights offered to the tenant (Table 1). The
contracted fields were originally allocated directly by the government through the PA and
involve some restrictions such as on growing of trees on usufruct rights. Hence, the contract
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between the PA-landowner and the tenant cannot offer more rights to the tenant than those
offered by the government.
Most farmers on PA-allocated fields (or owner cultivators) are able to exercise most of the
usufruct rights shown in Table 1. About one-fifth of farmers felt they could not build wells,
stone bunds, or permanent fences of metal or stone. However, these responses may reflect
more their desire rather than their right, since the distinction between rights and desire or
practice is difficult to make to farmers, the concept of rights being rather abstract. In contrast,
farmers on the contracted fields were substantially more restricted in all activities except for
the right to choose the crop they plant. Undertaking structural changes, fallowing the land, and
subcontracting out the land were usually not possible for farmers with land contracts. As on all
contracted fields, the range of use and modification rights is more restricted than on PA-
allocated fields. However, fixed-fee renters have the broadest range of rights among users of
contracted fields. They also are the most likely to have a written contract.
Of the contracted fields, fixed rental fields have the shortest leases. Ninety-one percent
operated under a one-year agreement and was less often extended compared to agreements
established by borrowers or sharecroppers, as indicated by the number of years the field had
actually been used. Sharecropped fields are held longer than fixed rental fields, with 23%
under long-term agreements and an average holding time of three years. The reverse is true
in terms of rights. The considerably more restricted range of rights on sharecropped than
fixed-rent fields reflect the lack of autonomy for the share-tenant in this partnership.
Surprisingly, almost one-half of the sharecroppers revealed that they could share out (53%),
rent out (44%), or lend out (45%) of their plots. This highlights our earlier concern about the
difficulty of farmers distinguishing rights from desires. On the other hand, since some
sharecroppers also owned land, they may have been referring to their rights on their own land
rather than the sharecropped land.
The average duration of the borrowed and gifted lands comes closest of all the land contracts
to the PA-allocated fields, with 81% of the users operating under an indefinite period.
Furthermore, the arrangement rarely requires a written contract (Table 1). Even though they
attract the longest contracts, their range of rights is very restricted, more restrictive than rented
fields and much more restrictive than PA-allocated fields.
In the next section, the relative efficiency and determinants of inefficiency of the fixed rent,
sharecrop, and gift or lending land tenure arrangements (versus PA-allocated or owner
cultivated tenure) are examined, using the stochastic production frontier approach and data
from the ILRI survey.
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5    Measurement of technical efficiency
5.1 Empirical model
5.2 Variables in the frontier production function
5.3 Variables in the technical efficiency model
There are two common approaches in the literature for estimating technical efficiency. One
approach is based on non-parametric, non-stochastic, and linear programming (data
envelopment analysis). This suffers from the criticism that it takes no account of the possible
influence of measurement error and other noise in the data (Coelli 1995). The second
approach uses econometrics to estimate a stochastic frontier function, and estimate the
inefficiency component of the error term. The disadvantage of this approach is that it imposes
an explicit and possibly restrictive functional form on the technology. However, this approach
is chosen here because it permits the estimation of the determinants of inefficiency of the
producing unit, which is the main focus of this paper.
Farrell (1957) suggested a deterministic method of measuring the technical efficiency of a firm
in an industry by estimating a frontier production function. Several extensions of Farrell's
model have been made, the most recent being the stochastic frontier models developed by
Aigner, Lovel and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), which have been
used extensively (Coelli 1995).
The stochastic frontier model assumes an error term with two additive components-
asymmetric component that accounts for pure random factors (vi), and a one-sided
component, which captures the effects of inefficiency relative to the stochastic frontier (ui). The
random factor (v) is independently and identically distributed with N(0,δv
2) while the technical
inefficiency effects, (u), is often assumed to have a half normal7 distribution |N(0,δv
2)|. The
model is expressed as:
Yi=xiβ+(vi–ui)                                         (1)
 
TE=exp–ui=ziδ                                      (2)
where xi is vector of input quantities of the i
th firm, zi is the vector of firm-specific factors
determining inefficiency. The β and δ are unknown parameters to be estimated together with
the variance parameters expressed as σ2 = σ2v+ σ
2
u and y = (σ
2
u/(σ
2
v +σ
2
u ). The
parameter, y, has a value between zero and one, such that the value of zero is associated
with the traditional response function, for which the non-negative random variable, ui, is
absent from the model. Technical efficiency is defined as TEi = exp(–ui). It is predicted using
the conditional expectation of exp(–ui), given the composed error term in equation 1. In this
specification, the parameters, β, σ, σu, σv and g can be estimated by method of maximum
likelihood, using the computer program, FRONTIER Version 4.1 (Coelli 1996). This computer
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program also computes estimates of efficiency.
7. Although other assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency effect (u) such  as the
truncated normal and exponential distribution are available, the half normal distribution has
become a fairly standard choice for  the one-sided distribution  in the literature.  An additional
advantage of assuming half normal here is that  it allows us to use FRONTIER program for
estimating the parameters of the frontier functions and inefficiency effects.
 5.1 Empirical model
Data on the sample of 477 plots in the land tenure survey in Arsi is used to estimate a Cobb-
Douglas stochastic production frontier.8 A single equation model is justified, since input
allocations and output are observed, implying the general input allocation case where
technological relationships can be estimated directly without explicit assumptions that restrict
either behaviour or technology (Just et al. 1983).
8. A translog production frontier was attempted.  However, the Cobb-Douglas function was
preferred due to the severe multi-colleanearity introduced by the interaction terms in the
translog.
 5.2 Variables in the frontier production function
Output of a plot depends in general on labour, traction, purchased inputs such as seed,
fertiliser and pesticides, plot area, soil quality of the plot and the type of crop grown. In the
estimation, including plot area in the model introduces severe multicollinearity as detected by
variance inflation factor greater than 5. As such, plot output and inputs are normalised by plot
area. The dependent variable in the model is the value of output of the plot per hectare
including both grains and straw.
Only labour for land preparation and crop establishment (establishment labour) and seeding,
weeding, and fertiliser and pesticide application (seeding and weeding labour) are included in
the model as explanatory variables. Labour used for harvesting, threshing and transport of
produce is usually proportional to yield and should not affect the frontier. Hence, only animal
traction input for land preparation is included.
Purchased inputs including seed, fertiliser and pesticides are valued to compute total costs of
inputs per hectare. It would be desirable to have different coefficients (effects) for these
individual inputs because they are very likely to have different influences on crop production.
However, there are significant proportions of the sample plots that have zero values for these
inputs.
In addition to the traditional inputs, plot productivity is influenced by the quality of the plot land.
Due to its substantial variation, land quality is hypothesised to be an important determinant of
output. We constructed the land quality measure as an index based on farmers' perceptions of
the quality of their plots with respect to the extent to which i) soil infertility, ii) damage from
animals, iii) damage from pests, rats and mice, and iv) water logging are problems. Soil
infertility is the most frequent problem reported to be moderate or severe problem on more
than one-third of the plots. Each of these problems was rated by farmers as either not a major
problem, moderate or severe problem. A score of 1 to 3 was assigned to the severity of the
problem i.e. 1 to severe problem, 2 for moderate problem, and 3 when the problem is not a
major one on the plot. The index for the ith plot relative to the score of best land is computed
as: qi =∑ jsij/12 where sij is the severity score of the jth problem on the ith plot. The score of
land quality, theoretically, ranges from 0.33 (the worst quality) to 1 (best land) but the
computed score ranges from 0.426 to 1. 
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Farmers in this area grow a wide range of crops but the major crops include wheat, barley and
horse beans. We hypothesise that the intercept of the production frontier is influenced by crop
choice on the plot. The choice of the crop is categorised as wheat, barley, other cereals
(including maize and teff), pulses (horse beans and field peas), and other crops mainly garden
crops such as onion and garlic. The coefficients of the dummy variables (excluding wheat),
therefore, compare the production frontier of barley, other cereals, pulses and other crops to
that of wheat.
Finally, the frontier model includes location dummies. The sample farmers were selected from
four different locations, namely Abichu, Bilalo, Ketar Genet and Mecro Chebote. Since some
variations in altitude, common soil types, crop and livestock mix, and degree of landlessness
may exist, we hypothesise that the frontier may shift by location.
 5.3 Variables in the technical efficiency model
Beside the type of land contract, many household socio-economic and farm characteristics
may affect the technical efficiency of the plot. To measure technical inefficiency of land
tenures relative to land cultivated by owner, commonly known as PA-land, three dummy
variables denoting the type of land contract (rental, sharing and borrowing) are included.
According to our hypotheses about the effect of tenure contracts, we expect positive
coefficients on rented, shared and gift plots. Beside whether the land tenure contracts are
statistically different from zero, it is necessary to test whether their respective coefficients are
equal. These hypotheses can be tested using t-tests.
Resource base of the household is hypothesised to affect technical efficiency through their
effect on input use. The total land area cultivated, and the number of oxen owned by the
household is introduced as the most important indicators of the household resource base. In
addition, the ratio of household supplied hours in total labour use and the ratio of hours
supplied by adult male labour in total labour use are included to test the relative efficiency of
household labour and male labour since these factors may affect the unobserved quality of
labour. Among the most important socio-economic variables in the technical efficiency model
are age, sex and education of the head of the house- hold, wealth and ethnic group of the
household. These variables are likely to influence farmer's perception and willingness to adopt
new innovations as well as their effect on the unobserved labour quality and management
skills and therefore may affect technical inefficiency.
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6    Results and discussion
6.1 Descriptive statistics
6.2 The stochastic frontier function
6.3 Inefficiency effects
6.4 Efficiency effect of land tenure contracts
6.5 Other determinants of inefficiency
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of the variables in the stochastic frontier (efficiency) and inefficiency
models are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Value of output per hectare averages Ethiopian Birr
(EB) 2478 with the highest returns obtained on land cultivated by owners. Statistically, average
returns from gift plots are significantly lower than those from owned and rented plots but
average returns of share-cropped and gift plots are not significantly different from each other.
Table 2. Average value of output per hectare, input use per hectare and soil quality on plots
with alternative land tenure contracts in Arsi, Ethiopia.
Variable
Owned
plots
Rented
plots
Share-cropped
plots Gift plots Average
No. of plots 295.0 74.0 44.0 63.0 476.0
Value of output per hectare (EB/ha) 2546.35a* 2535.87a~ 2439.12ab 2120.23b~ 2478.42
Establishment labour (hrs/ha) 112.32a 122.11a 110.29a 122.50a 115.0
Seeding and weeding labour (hrs/ha) 117.83a* 58.75b* 54.98b* 80.50ab* 97.89
Pre-harvest animal traction (hours) 226.74a 224.18a 226.01a 246.05a 231.94
Input cost (EB/ha) 528.19a 450.24a 451.19a 461.15a 500.08
Soil quality index 0.107a 0.107a 0.092a 0.094a 0.104
Plots in wheat (%) 36.27 59.46 61.36 41.27 42.86
Plots in barley (%) 29.49 25.68 15.91 28.57 27.52
Plots in other cereals (%) 11.19 5.41 9.09 7.94 9.66
Plots in pulses (%) 13.22 6.76 13.64 11.11 11.97
Plots in other crops (%) 9.83 2.7 0 11.11 7.98
Means superscripted by the same letter along rows are not statistically different. Means superscripted by
different letters are statistically different from each other at 5% level when superscript is followed by * and at
10% level when followed by ~. Equality of means tests are irrelevant to crop distribution.
Source: Authors' calculation from ILRI's land tenure survey in Arsi (1994).
While there are no significant differences in labour use for crop establishment, plots under
different land tenure arrangements receive significantly different quantities of labour for
seeding and weeding, a period of high demand for labour. Rented and sharecropped plots
receive less than half of the labour input on plots cultivated by owners during these operations.
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Animal traction averages 231.94 hours per hectare with no statistically significant difference
between land tenure systems.
Average cost of seed, inorganic fertiliser and herbicides is EB 500/ha with no significant
difference between land tenure contracts. However, input cost on owner-cultivated plots is
17% higher than those on rented and sharecropped plots. This difference may be attributed to
the varying crop requirements on these plots. Similarly, there is no statistically significant
difference in land quality between plots of different contracts. Regardless of the tenure
arrangement of the plot, wheat, a principal cereal crop in the area, is produced on most of the
plots (36–61%). Rented and sharecropped plots are mainly allocated to wheat (Table 2).
The age of the head of the household in the sample varies from 17 to 87 years and averaged
35.3 years (Table 3). Older farmers reflect longer farming experience but are likely to have
received less formal education and tend to be conservative with respect to adoption of new
technology.
Table 3. Socio-economic characteristics of the study sample farmers in the highlands of
Ethiopia.
Variable  
Average age of the head of the household (years) 35.26
Average family size (persons) 4.32
Average dependency ratioa 0.55
Average ratio of females in the household 0.36
Average number of work oxen owned (oxen) 1.63
Average cultivated area (ha) 1.55
Gender distribution of household heads (%)
Households with male heads 92.5
Households with female heads 7.5
Wealth status of the household (%)  
Poor 29.8
Medium wealth 57.1
Rich 13.0
Education status of the head of the household (%) 
Illiterate 31.06
Minimum literacy (just read and write) 14.29
Formal education 54.65
Primary occupation of the head of the 
household (%)
Farmer 97.5
Others 2.5
Ethnic group of the head of household (%)
Oromo 75.8
Other ethnic groups 24.2
a. Dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of dependents (age
below 15 and above 60) to number of adults (age above 15 years and below
60).
Source: Authors' calculation from ILRI's land tenure survey in Arsi (1994).
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Among the sample households, 31% are illiterate and 14.3% can read and write in some
language with the majority of household heads (55%) having received a formal education of
up to high school level. Almost 30% of the households can be classified as relatively poor
based on their land and livestock resources and 13% are relatively rich. The primary
occupation of 97.5% of the heads of the households is farming with few traders, livestock
herders and salary employment. About 76% of the heads of the households are Oromo, the
principal ethnic group in this area. The rest are mainly immigrant and as such tend to be
landless.
Plot sizes are small with average area of 0.37 ha. However, households usually control
multiple plots with average farm holding of 1.55 ha. Livestock is an important enterprise in this
farming system. Average holding of livestock is 6.67 TLUs of which 1.63 heads (1.35 TLUs)
are draft oxen.
It is fundamental that all explanatory variables in the model be exogenous to the production
structure, so that none of the covariates in the second stage inefficiency analysis is correlated
with the variables in the frontier model resulting in multicollinearity or approximate linear
relationship among some of the regressors (Kennedy 1985). The inverse of the correlation
matrix is often used in detecting multicollinearity. The diagonal elements of this matrix are the
variance inflation factors (VIFi) given by (1-Ri
2)-1 where Ri2 is the R2 from regressing the ith
independent variable on all the other independent variables. A high VIF indicates an Ri2 near
unity and hence suggests collinearity. As a rule of thumb, for standardised data a VIFi > 10
indicates harmful collinearity (Kennedy 1985). In this study, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression equation is estimated with all the independent variables used in the frontier
production function and inefficiency model and their VIFi were computed. Maximum VIF in this
data set is 2.76 and most of the values are smaller than 2 (Appendix I). We concluded that
multicollinearity is not a serious problem here.
 6.2 The stochastic frontier function
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in the stochastic frontier and inefficiency
model are presented in Table 4. All the coefficients, with the exception of the type of crop
cultivated and location-specific dummy variables, are interpreted as the elasticities of output
value with respect to inputs. The elasticity of output with respect to purchased input (seed,
fertiliser and pesticides) is highly significant with a value of 0.33. An additional investment of
EB 1 in these inputs yields EB 0.63 in profit (EB 1.63 of revenues) at the mean output and
purchased inputs. This represents high returns to application of purchased inputs in this
system. One factor contributing to this high level of returns is probably the favourable climatic
conditions, mainly rainfall, where production response to fertilisation and improved seed
technology is expected to be high. The regression results support the hypothesis that the
quality of the plot is an important determinant of the slope of the production frontier. The
estimated elasticity with respect to land quality is 0.44. This indicates high returns to improving
land quality. All the problems reducing the quality of land, as measured here, can be reversed
through adoption of improved technologies such as inorganic fertiliser application, soil
conservation and drainage.
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates of the stochastic production frontier and technical
inefficiency model.
Variable Coefficient Estimate t-ratio
Intercept β0 6.373 21.0798
Purchased inputsa (Birr) β1 0.3255 8.643
a
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Land quality index  (Birr) β2 0.4392 2.7512
Crop establishment laboura (hrs) β3 0.0219 0.4142
Seeding and weedinga (hrs) β4 0.0333 2.5627
Pre-harvest animal traction (hrs)a β5 –0.0342 –0.9990
Crop type (dummies)
Other cereals β7 –0.3024 –4.4948
Barley β8 –0.3829 –5.6603
Pulses β9 –0.1235 –1.9511
Other crops β10 0.0544 0.6164
Location dummies 
Abichu (dummy) β11 –0.1852 –3.4877
Bilalo (dummy) β12 –0.0114 –0.1463
K. Genet (dummy) β13 –0.2167 –2.1958
a. Variables defined in natural logarithm. 
Dependent variable is log of value of output per hectare.
While crop establishment labour is statistically insignificant, weeding and seeding labour is
significantly different from zero with a coefficient of 0.03. The coefficient of pre-harvesting
animal traction is negative but is statistically insignificant. This is unexpected. However, animal
labour for land preparation varies principally with the slope of the land. Steep plots require
more time in ploughing, usually subject to water erosion and likely to be of lower productivity.
As such, this variable may capture the negative effect of land slope on crop yields.9
9. Slope of the plot is not included in computing the land quality index presented earlier for
lack of data. 
The production frontier of barley, pulses and other cereals differs significantly from that of
wheat. The coefficients (intercept shifters) on these variables are negative and significant. This
means the production frontier for these crops are distinctly below that of other crops. This
result explains the dominance of wheat in the crop mix of farmers in this area.
Although located in the same agro-ecological zone, the four locations of this study appear to
differ significantly with respect to the intercept of the production frontier. The coefficients on
two of the three location dummies are negative and statistically significantly different from
zero, i.e. the fourth location.
 6.3 Inefficiency effects
The efficiency estimates of the sample range from as low as 4% to as high as 94% and
averages 71%. The implication of this is quite significant as farmers can increase their crop
incomes by as high as 40% on average, by improving their technical efficiency. The frequency
distribution of the estimated efficiency is shown in Figure 1. One-quarter of the plots has an
estimated efficiency of 0.6 or less while 50% of the plots have estimated efficiency of 0.7 or
less. The estimated y (overall measure of inefficiency) is very high (0.97: Table 4) reflecting
the presence of significant technical inefficiency in the data set.
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Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of the estimated technical efficiency in the Ethiopian
highlands.
 6.4 Efficiency effect of land tenure contracts
Tenure status significantly influences technical efficiency (Table 5). Coefficients on the three
dummy variables defining the types of land contract, i.e. fixed rental, share-cropping, and gift
plots, are all positive, i.e. these tenure systems are less efficient compared to owner-cultivated
plots. However, only the coefficients on sharecropping and gift plots are statistically significant
and different from zero (cultivating own land). Using t-tests, the hypotheses of the equality of
the coefficients of fixed rental and sharecropping (H0: δ1 = δ2) and equality of the coefficients
of sharecropped and gift plots (δ2 = δ3), cannot be rejected. This indicates that the levels of
inefficiency associated with rental and sharecropping and that of sharecropping and gift plots
are not statistically different. However, the technical inefficiency effects of rent and gift plots
are statistically different at 10% level of significance.10 Compared to owner-cultivated farm
plots, therefore, sharecropping and lending land tenure arrangement are less efficient.
However, the degree of inefficiency varies as indicated by the magnitude of the coefficients.
Rented plots, on the other hand, are not statistically different in their inefficiency as compared
to owner-cultivated plots.
10. The calculated values of the t-statistics for Ho:δ1=δ2, Ho:δ2=δ3, and δ1=δ3 are
respectively, –1.02, –0.654.
Table 5. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of technical inefficiency model.
Variable1 Coefficients Estimates t-ratio
Intercept δ0 –4.7555 –1.2623
Rented plot (dummy) δ1 1.0088 1.564
Share-cropped plot (dummy) δ2 2.4937 2.0179
Gift plot (dummy) δ3 4.0344 2.025
Household head age (years) δ4 -0.0871 -1.8944
Household head sex (=1 if male) δ5 0.9771 1.0842
Education (=1 if illiterate) δ6 1.9951 1.7681
Education (=1 if minimum literacy) δ7 –2.0318 –1.8582
Ethnic group (=1 if Oromo) δ8 –0.0489 –0.1575
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Principal occupation (=1 if farmer) δ9 1.0884 0.9349
Dependency ratio δ10 0.6012 1.5121
Women ratio δ11 0.6979 0.7571
Wealth (=1 if poor) δ12 –0.1317 –0.3095
Land area cultivated (ha) δ13 0.6009 1.9837
No. of oxen owned (number) δ14 -0.2056 –1.6883
Ratio of household labour δ15 4.4758 2.0382
Ratio of men labour δ16 –7.7808 –2.2509
Sigma-square σ2 3.1716 2.048
Gama g 0.9697 66.7936
Log likelihood function L –318.7621  
1. Dependent variable is technical inefficiency measure determined in a single stage procedure
and estimated using FRONTIER 4.1.
Figure 2 compares the cumulative distribution of technical efficiency associated with the
different types of land tenure. More than one-half of the farmers cultivating their own plots
operate above the estimated average efficiency level compared to less than one-quarter
cultivating borrowed plots. Average technical efficiency of both owner-cultivated and rented
plots is very similar, 0.73, compared to 0.67 for sharecropped plots and 0.64 for gift plots. On
average, technical efficiency of owner-cultivated and rented plots is 10 and 15% higher than
sharecropping and borrowed plots, respectively.
Figure 2. Cumulative distribution of the estimated efficiency of owner-cultivated plots as
compared to alternative land tenure arrangements in the Ethiopian highlands.
The different levels of inefficiency associated with the land tenure systems can be explained
by the relative degree of restrictions involved and interaction of labour and input markets.
Fixed rent plots have the least restrictions, with respect to the rights of the tenant, and do not
involve labour or input exchange. Thus, since the fixed renter or tenant pays for all inputs and,
subsequently, reaps all benefits (or losses) of his or her cropping activities with the least
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restrictions on his input–output decisions, fixed rent contracts are not associated with
significant inefficiency. The renter is the residual claimant to output and so fixed rental tenancy
results in resource allocation and technical efficiency that is equal to owner cultivated plots.
Sharecropping, on the other hand, involves a commitment by both partners to share the costs
of inputs and benefits of outputs, but considerable restrictions on rights of the sharecropper.
Moreover, the tenant is required to provide labour input to the landowner, so that substantial
delays in performing critical field operations and sub-optimal use of labour on tenant's fields
may occur. Therefore, despite the contribution of the landowner, in terms of inputs, lack of
autonomy on the part of the tenant in this partnership explains the inefficiency of
sharecropping. Similar labour constraints and lack of timeliness of performing field activities
may also explain the relative inefficiency of borrowed plots.
Despite their relative inefficiency, however, sharecropping and gifting are still common types of
land transactions in Ethiopia. One explanation for this is the growing landlessness in rural
areas due to population pressure and limited alternative livelihood opportunities. This may
give landowners an advantage in negotiating land contracts. Other motives include resource
and risk pooling. Since the implicit cost of share-cropping is 40% of that of fixed rent paid after
harvest, sharecropping may be motivated by inability of the tenant to pay advanced (i.e.
before planting or harvesting) fixed rent, given the absence of credit market.
 6.5 Other determinants of inefficiency
Besides land tenure systems, several socio-economic and resource factors have significant
influence on technical inefficiency (Table 5). The negative coefficient of age indicates that
technical inefficiency appears to be lower among older farmers. Age here captures farming
experience, which may accumulate over time as a result of learning by doing. Thus, an older
farmer may become more proficient with his technology as he accumulates information (Feder
et al. 1985).
The relative efficiency of family labour is not readily apparent. High proportion of family labour
in total labour may reduce technical efficiency as indicated by the positive and statistically
significant coefficient. Households obtain labour from neighbours and the community in
exchange arrangements while wage labour hiring in farming is limited. High levels of
proportion of family labour involvement may indicate that the household faces a tight labour
constraint, possibly leading to unobserved effort or binding constraint at a critical demand
periods, thus resulting in technical inefficiency.
Technical inefficiency decreases with an increase in the number of oxen owned by the
household. Clearly, households with more oxen are able to carry out land preparation
operations timely and attract more non-farm labour through exchange of oxen. Compared to
heads of households with formal education, illiterate farmers are more inefficient. However,
farmers who are able to read and write with no formal education are more efficient than those
with formal education. Apparently, the ability to write and read may be sufficient in the context
of improving technical inefficiency of farming. This result is consistent with the theory of
adoption of innovation as education enhances technology uptake and perhaps the returns to
adoption.
Relatively smaller farm size reduces inefficiency, as indicated by the positive and significant
coefficient on land area cultivated. This may be due to low levels of resources and technology
that allow efficient operations. This inverse farm-size relationship is consistent with the
literature. This may be because unobserved aspects of land quality are lower for households
with more land especially where land redistribution have tried to balance land quality and
availability to the households. This may be also because of unmeasured inputs such as quality
of labour and management effort. There may also be diseconomies of scale as implied by the
sum of the coefficients of the Cobb-Douglas function (Table 4).
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Women ratio in the household has no significant impact on technical efficiency. Apparently,
women ratio does not affect labour supply to farming especially during the periods of high
demand for women labour such as weeding, harvesting and threshing. However, the higher
the proportion of men labour, the higher the technical efficiency on the plot, relative to child
and women labour. The other variables, wealth, sex and principal occupation of the household
head, dependency ratio and ethnicity, have no statistical impact on reducing inefficiency.
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7    Conclusion
As a result of the high population pressure, land scarcity is becoming pervasive and the
degree of landlessness is increasing among the rural population of the highlands of Ethiopia.
Due to limited availability of alternative employment opportunities, access to land and
functioning of land market is becoming an increasingly critical policy issue. As elements of the
traditional systems of land tenure and evolving land market institutions are re-emerging,
analysis of the technical efficiency of alternative land tenure systems is essential for land
policy formulation by identifying policies that facilitate the more efficient transactions.
Moreover, the issue of the impact of land tenure systems on agricultural productivity in sub-
Saharan Africa is still unresolved despite the attention it received from development
economists.
This paper analyses the technical efficiency of plots cultivated under the dominant land tenure
systems in the highlands of Ethiopia. The analysis implicitly captures the interaction of other
markets as these land tenure systems involve varying degrees of interaction with labour, input,
credit and insurance markets. For example, share-cropping involves advanced credit to the
tenant in form of deferred rent payment and input in exchange for predetermined proportion of
output but also labour. Similarly, labour supply is an implicit part of land gift agreement, i.e.
labour wages paid in form of implicit rent by owner of the land. The econometric results
indicate that land transactions such as sharecropping and land gift that involved restrictions on
tenant's decision making are technically inefficient compared to owner-cultivated or fixed
rental tenures.
These results imply that public policies that facilitate efficient functioning of the inter-related
markets and that help create alternative employment opportunities to reduce pressure on
agricultural land can help increase technical efficiency. If, for example, the main motive for
sharecropping is risk pooling and that missing credit markets discourage fixed rentals,
functioning of credit and insurance markets may encourage fixed rentals. Alternative wage
employment opportunities may raise farm labour productivity and encourage wage labour. The
conclusion from this study compares to others in Asia, where sharecropping is often a 'second
best efficient' in situations of imperfect or missing factor markets. The implication of this is that
banning sharecropping, as has been the case during the Derg regime, with or without a
private market for land, may lower efficiency in the presence of failure of credit, labour and
oxen markets.
Some caveat worth mentioning. First, this analysis used a cross sectional data from one
region in Ethiopia. Although land tenure systems are fairly similar in the country, some
regional differences may exist. Second, the quantitative analysis made some explicit
assumption about the distribution of inefficiency to facilitate the use of the FRONTIER
methodology. The statistical issues of testing the validity of this assumption may need to be
addressed in future research.
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Appendix I. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of coefficients
and collinearity statistics of variables in the production frontier and
inefficiency model
Coefficient
estimates t-stat
Collinearity statistics
Tolerance VIF*
Intercept 5.644 11.699   
Purchased inputsa (Birr) 0.338 8.044 0.723 1.384
Land quality indexa (Birr) 0.674 3.285 0.826 1.211
Crop establishment laboura (hrs) 0.067 1.144 0.583 1.716
Seeding and weedinga (hrs) 0.041 2.706 0.711 1.407
Pre-harvest animal traction (hrs)a 0.028 0.704 0.362 2.759
Other cereals 0.008 0.081 0.616 1.622
Barley 0.196 –3.138 0.742 1.348
Pulses 0.112 –1.178 0.609 1.642
Other crops 0.37 –3.132 0.563 1.777
Abichu (dummy) 0.388 –4.739 0.438 2.283
Bilalo (dummy) 0.423 –4.956 0.44 2.27
K. Genet (dummy) 0.14 –1.688 0.505 1.98
Rented plot (dummy) 0.105 –1.321 0.692 1.446
Share-cropped plot (dummy) 0.183 –1.952 0.785 1.273
Gift plot (dummy) 0.25 –2.649 0.564 1.774
Household head age (years) 0.004 1.608 0.446 2.242
Household head sex (=1 if male) 0.121 –1.142 0.752 1.329
Education (=1 if illiterate) 0.143 –1.752 0.396 2.523
Education (=1 if minimum literacy) 0.048 0.547 0.57 1.753
Ethnic group (=1 if Oromo) 0.014 0.196 0.657 1.523
Principal occupation (=1 if farmer) 0.143 0.688 0.921 1.086
Dependency ratio 0.056 0.999 0.639 1.565
Women ratio 0.13 0.941 0.6 1.666
Wealth (=1 if poor) 0.056 0.656 0.558 1.791
Land area cultivated (ha) 0.024 –1.031 0.423 2.363
AppendixIa
file:///C|/Users/dhmichael/Desktop/fulldoc_html/wp39/AppendixIa.htm[5/30/2016 3:16:39 PM]
No. of oxen owned (number) 0.012 0.629 0.427 2.341
Ratio of household labour 0.096 0.748 0.549 1.82
Ratio of men labour 0.276 1.078 0.635 1.575
*VIF = Variance Inflation Factor.
a. Variables defined as natural log. The dependent variable is log of output value per hectare (Birr).
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